
2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Main Committee III

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 May 2015, at 3 p.m.

Chair: Mr. Stuart (Australia)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

Organization of work

1. **The Chair** said that Main Committee III had the task of dealing with agenda items 16 (d) and (e) and 17 (NPT/CONF.2015/1). In addition, the plenary had established a subsidiary body which would focus on item 16 (e). He drew attention to the draft programme of work for the Committee and its subsidiary body, contained in document NPT/CONF.2015/MC.III/INF/1.

<http://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2015/MC.III/INF/1..2>.

The programme of work was adopted.

3. **Mr. Abdrakhmanov** (Kazakhstan), speaking as Chair of Subsidiary Body 3, said that the subsidiary body would devote three sessions to article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and two sessions to the strengthened review process. Open, frank, transparent and inclusive discussions would be held with delegations in order to produce an honest and objective report.

General exchange of views

4. **Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, said that all parties to the Treaty had the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. The Group urged all States parties to allow that right to be fully realized.

5. All States parties also had the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and any measures designed to hamper those inalienable rights would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between the rights and obligations of States parties and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries.

6. The Group therefore called for the immediate removal of all restrictions on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), since the Treaty did not prohibit such transfer and merely stipulated that such technology, equipment and

material must be subject to IAEA safeguards. Any interpretation of the Treaty that was used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty. The Group was therefore concerned that some States parties had made the conclusion of an additional protocol a condition for such transfers, and called on those States to remove such conditions promptly.

7. The transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries was important to enhance their scientific and technological capabilities and facilitate their socioeconomic development; all States parties should assist developing countries in that regard. While it was confident in the impartiality and professionalism of IAEA, the Group strongly rejected the politicization of the work of the Agency and its Technical Cooperation Programme. The Technical Cooperation Programme should be provided with sufficient financial and human resources to ensure its sustainability.

8. Each State party had a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies in accordance with its rights and obligations under the Treaty, which included the inalienable right to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should take into account all technical, legal, political and economic implications and should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent. In addition, any decision to that effect should be made by consensus, taking into account the interests of all States parties.

9. Proliferation concerns should be addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Furthermore, non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States, and should not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful and developmental purposes. Such arrangements must include adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply of materials to or cooperation with any State not party to the Treaty.

10. The Group remained deeply concerned about the ability of States not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how from nuclear-weapon States, and strongly called for the

enforcement of the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear equipment, information, materials, facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty. Any attack or threat against peaceful nuclear facilities was a threat to international peace and security and the environment, and a grave violation of international law, the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and IAEA regulations. A comprehensive, multilaterally negotiated instrument was needed to prohibit attacks on facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

11. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties was deeply concerned at the unilateral, politically motivated restrictions imposed on developing countries, which seriously hampered the exercise by those countries of their inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and violated article III of the Treaty. Measures were needed to strengthen the protection of confidential information relating to IAEA safeguards and to ensure that such information was not provided to any party not authorized by the Agency.

12. The Group rejected any attempt at reinterpreting the rights and obligations under the Treaty in a manner that was inconsistent with its object and purpose, including the imposition of any conditions that went beyond the provisions of the Treaty. In particular, the right of withdrawal from treaties should be governed by international treaty law. Lastly, the Group wished to draw attention to two working papers that it had submitted ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.5](#) and [NPT/CONF.2015/WP.24](#)) and urged the Committee to incorporate the recommendations made in those papers into its final report.

13. **Ms. Zanathy** (Observer for the European Union), speaking also on behalf of the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process country Bosnia and Herzegovina; and, in addition, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. The European Union was strongly committed to the objectives of article IV and supported many peaceful and beneficial applications of nuclear technology in

developing and other countries through multilateral and bilateral cooperation programmes.

14. To exercise the right to use nuclear energy, States parties were required to observe non-proliferation commitments, implement IAEA safeguards and pursue purely peaceful purposes in accordance with the good-faith principle. The States members of the European Union were open to cooperation with all interested countries on the safe and secure development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring that sensitive technologies and goods were not disseminated for non-peaceful purposes.

15. The European Union firmly supported the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and the extension of the Peaceful Uses Initiative, and encouraged all States to contribute to that effort. It welcomed the initiative to modernize the IAEA nuclear applications laboratories located in Seibersdorf, Austria and to strengthen the Agency's role in facilitating the responsible development of peaceful applications of nuclear technology. It encouraged all States to identify new ways of mobilizing supplementary funds for IAEA activities and opportunities for new partnerships with the private sector, development agencies and international organizations.

16. The European Union promoted multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, which could help provide nuclear fuel supply security without distorting the existing, well-functioning market, under the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions. All parties concerned should engage constructively to make progress on the establishment of the IAEA low enriched uranium bank.

17. The European Union supported nuclear safety projects in several regions around the world through its Nuclear Safety Cooperation Instrument and other tools dedicated to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risk mitigation. It had also allocated more than \$260 million to its Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative for the period 2014-2020.

18. The Fukushima Daiichi accident had highlighted the need to regularly assess and continuously improve the safety of nuclear installations, including the adoption of measures to prevent accidents and mitigate their consequences. IAEA should maintain a dynamic and multi-year vision of priorities in the field of nuclear safety after the end of the period covered by

the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)).

19. The European Union welcomed the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, which had been adopted at the diplomatic conference of the contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The objectives of that Declaration had already been incorporated into legally binding European Union legislation and all States parties to the Convention were urged to fulfil those objectives without delay.

20. The European Union urged States members of IAEA to host Integrated Regulatory Review Service and other peer review missions, and to conduct national reviews on a regular basis. In addition, all States should enhance transparency in the field of nuclear safety by publishing the results of peer review missions and announcing the programme of peer review missions for upcoming years. The European Union also called on all States to review their nuclear installations on the basis of a comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessment, if they had not already done so.

21. All States should implement policies and programmes for the safe and long-term management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste generated on national territory. The Review Conference should express support for the further development of national, bilateral, regional and international cooperation relating to education and awareness-raising, to ensure adequate training and qualification of the workforce required for the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

22. Ongoing international cooperation was required to strengthen nuclear safety and security, safe waste and spent fuel management, emergency preparedness and response arrangements and radiological protection. States that had not done so should accede to all relevant conventions as soon as possible. Where appropriate, States should also give due consideration to the possibility of joining nuclear liability instruments.

23. Robust security in the management of nuclear and radioactive materials was a national responsibility. Effective physical protection regimes, a strong nuclear security culture and appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks all contributed to preventing illicit

appropriation of nuclear or radioactive material and protecting nuclear facilities against malicious acts.

24. Strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime was important for the further development of nuclear applications for peaceful purposes. The European Union therefore called on all States parties to be united in recommending to the Review Conference specific measures to ensure the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions, by countries that wished to start or develop capacities in that field.

25. **Mr. Shaw** (Observer for the International Atomic Energy Agency) said that helping countries to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear technology was a central pillar of the work of IAEA. The Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme was one of the main vehicles for delivering assistance to help its member States build, strengthen and maintain capacities in the use of nuclear techniques in support of national development priorities. Continuous dialogue between IAEA and member States ensured that its limited resources were used efficiently.

26. The IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative provided additional funds for the Agency's development work and had helped to raise over 60 million euros for projects that had benefited more than 130 countries. Additional contributions by member States would enable IAEA to continue that valuable initiative. IAEA worked with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to help countries to use nuclear technology to produce more, better and safer food. It also cooperated with more than 500 agricultural research institutes and experimental stations on nuclear applications that contributed to food security and sustainable agricultural development.

27. The Agency had launched a project to build the capacity of African countries to detect zoonotic diseases and, during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, had supplied affected countries with kits to diagnose the disease more quickly. Working in partnership with the World Health Organization, the Agency helped countries gain access to nuclear technology for medical care. The IAEA sterile insect technique made it possible to fight insect pests without harming any other species, and scientists at the Agency were working to find out how that technique could be applied to fight malaria and dengue fever. The IAEA Ocean

Acidification International Coordination Centre was bringing together leading scientists to examine the impacts of ocean acidification on marine ecosystems and to provide essential data on changes in that area.

28. IAEA helped countries to use nuclear technology to make informed decisions about sustainable water resource management. As part of the IAEA General Conference, to be held in September 2015, a scientific forum would be organized to discuss how radiation technologies could be used to lessen the negative impact of industrial effluents and assist in the production of environmentally friendly materials. IAEA laboratories also provided direct scientific and technical assistance to member States, but eight of those laboratories were in need of modernization. Extrabudgetary contributions were needed to support the renovation and construction of new laboratory buildings.

29. Nuclear power was being increasingly used by many countries, which regarded it as a stable and clean source of energy, and IAEA would continue to provide assistance and share knowledge among member States to help them use nuclear power safely, responsibly and sustainably. It was also working to establish its low enriched uranium bank as a contribution to the assurance of nuclear fuel supply.

30. Extensive efforts had been made since the Fukushima Daiichi accident to strengthen nuclear safety, in particular through the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. Although primary responsibility for nuclear safety lay with each individual country, international cooperation was vital and IAEA played the central role in bringing together Governments and technical experts in the nuclear safety field. The Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety had been adopted in February 2015 by the contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and was designed to strengthen efforts to prevent accidents and mitigate the radiological consequences of any accidents.

31. Lastly, all States should participate in the international conference on nuclear security scheduled for December 2016, and any State that had not done so should become party to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as soon as possible, so that it could enter into force. IAEA encouraged all States to ensure that the importance of science and technology to development, including nuclear technology, was recognized in the

final document of the Review Conference and as an important part of the post-2015 development agenda.

32. **Ms. Stromšíková** (Czech Republic) said that the Czech Republic firmly supported the right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided that they exercised that right in a responsible manner and in accordance with their non-proliferation obligations under international standards and safeguards agreements. Export controls should be universalized and implemented in line with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), in order to create a more reliable environment for the transfer of nuclear technologies and dual-use goods for peaceful purposes. International cooperation was vital to strengthen nuclear safety and security and to achieve universal accession to all relevant conventions as soon as possible.

33. The Czech Republic had an advanced peaceful nuclear programme and was committed to the promotion of a safety and security culture at both the international and the domestic levels. To that end, its national regulatory authority carried out outreach activities directed at the national nuclear industry and held seminars on internal compliance programmes, due diligence and risk assessment. An efficient independent regulatory authority was an essential component of an effective regulatory infrastructure and facilitated the sharing of knowledge and information on lessons learned relating to non-proliferation.

34. The Czech Republic shared nuclear knowledge and information through its participation in the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and was a regular contributor to the Agency's Technical Cooperation Fund. It also actively participated in the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative in order to demonstrate that responsible exercise of the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy could benefit society by leading to advancements in medicine, water sanitation and other non-energy nuclear applications.

35. **Mr. Kitano** (Japan) said that significant progress had been made in implementing most of the actions contained in the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. Peaceful uses of nuclear technology could help States to promote sustainable development, protect the environment and address other global challenges. His delegation commended IAEA on its tireless efforts to support developing countries in the peaceful use of that technology,

including through its Peaceful Uses Initiative. Increased recognition of the potential uses of nuclear technology and its further promotion would facilitate implementation of the post-2015 development agenda. However, the Fukushima Daiichi accident served as a reminder of the importance of nuclear safety worldwide; the peaceful uses of nuclear technology should therefore be promoted on the basis of experience and lessons learned in nuclear safety.

36. Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, all States parties enjoyed the inalienable right to the development research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with its articles I, II and III. However, the use of nuclear science and technology must be accompanied by a commitment to the ongoing implementation of safeguards and safety, security and radiation protection at an appropriate and effective level, in accordance with national legislation and international obligations. In that regard, his delegation drew attention to the working paper that it had submitted (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.18), which highlighted key elements to further strengthen the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.

37. Access to nuclear technology for developing countries should be enhanced by assisting with capacity-building, providing equipment, strengthening regional networking frameworks, and facilitating cooperation among those countries. It was also important to broaden nuclear applications, in order to enable States to meet their fundamental needs for socioeconomic development in areas such as health, food security and agriculture.

38. In that context, modernization of the IAEA nuclear applications laboratories located in Seibersdorf, Austria was very important to help enhance research and development in different nuclear applications and provide further opportunities for the transfer of technology to IAEA member States. To assist the Agency in implementing that project as soon as possible, Japan would be disbursing \$2 million of its contribution to the Peaceful Uses Initiative. It had contributed more than \$13 million to the Peaceful Uses Initiative over the previous five years and would contribute a total of \$25 million over the following five years. It encouraged other States parties and relevant organizations to show similar support for IAEA activities relating to peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

39. Strengthening nuclear safety and radiation protection was a vital component of the development of nuclear science and technology for both power and non-power applications. States parties should continue maintaining and improving national and international infrastructure to that end. Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the country's nuclear power plants had to meet new regulatory requirements before restarting operations and must now be placed under the scrutiny of an independent nuclear regulation authority. Nuclear safety remained of the utmost importance to Japan, which would continue to share with the international community the lessons learned from that accident. Japan was implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and urged other States parties to do the same, in order to enhance nuclear safety worldwide.

40. The safe transport of radioactive material was an essential aspect of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan transported nuclear materials in strict compliance with the relevant international standards and in accordance with maritime navigation rights under international law. Maintaining dialogue with coastal States was extremely important in promoting mutual understanding and confidence-building.

41. The increasing number of contracting parties to the various treaties and conventions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy contributed to the creation of more robust international legal frameworks. The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage had entered into force in Japan in April 2015, which was a significant step forward in the joint effort to establish a global nuclear liability regime. His delegation encouraged States parties to adhere to that convention and other international instruments and to facilitate their implementation, in order to strengthen the relevant international legal frameworks.

42. Education and public communication played an important role in disseminating information and raising public awareness of the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology; his delegation encouraged all States parties, groups of countries and relevant organizations to take measures to that end. Japan would continue to work with the international community to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a safe, secure and sustainable manner.

43. **Mr. Ruiz Mazón** (Mexico) said that Mexico was a strong defender of the inalienable right of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technologies. The Review Conference was the most appropriate international forum for discussion and deliberation on the balanced relationship that must exist between the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the other two pillars underpinning the Treaty regime. States parties had made significant progress in promoting the peaceful, safe and secure use of nuclear energy.

44. Mexico had signed, ratified and brought into force the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with IAEA. As a member of the New Agenda Coalition and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, it promoted proposals for nuclear-weapon States to sign verification and safeguards agreements with IAEA, since, in an asymmetry that was detrimental to the Treaty, the Agency did not verify nuclear military facilities in any of the nuclear-weapon States.

45. Mexico had joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and created an export control committee that considered the use and final destination of special materials being exported. It contributed to and supported projects undertaken as part of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme in the fields of energy, public health, agriculture, food security, water resources and climate change. It paid its contributions to the IAEA budget and Technical Cooperation Fund and contributed to or helped to organize relevant seminars, conferences, technical meetings, courses and regional workshops in various areas of nuclear application.

46. His Government also provided training courses and received visits from nuclear experts from various regions. Mexican professionals participated actively in various events, assistance and orientation activities, and helped in designing guidelines, norms and good practices in nuclear power, applications and security. In 2016, the Government would be coordinating activities undertaken under the Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean.

47. Mexico cooperated closely with IAEA in elaborating the Nuclear Security Series, participated in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, and applied the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security

of Radioactive Sources and Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. It had also received missions to all of its nuclear facilities from the International Physical Protection Advisory Service and the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service, and ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

48. Mexico had concluded the conversion of highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium for a nuclear research reactor and established a nuclear forensics laboratory within the National Institute for Nuclear Research. It participated in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and in all three Nuclear Security Summits held thus far, and was actively involved in the preparatory process for the Summit to be held in Washington, D.C. in 2016.

49. Lastly, with regard to the confusion and legal disagreements over the effectiveness of the withdrawal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Treaty, any discussion on the topic should focus on principles of international law covering treaties, including those set forth in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. He called on all States parties to invite legal experts to help them in considering the issue.

50. **Mr. Grossi** (Argentina) said that Argentina had long experience in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had relaunched its nuclear programme in 2006, based on a vision of nuclear energy production as key to inclusive development. The vision applied not only to nuclear energy for industrial growth, but also to the public health uses of nuclear technology. Cooperation activities, such as training, capacity-building and technology transfer and sale, were becoming central to the full enjoyment of the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Argentina was therefore extremely concerned about initiatives that aimed, directly or indirectly, to limit or hinder States' capacities to make full use of peaceful nuclear technology.

51. The signatories of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, adopted at the February 2015 Diplomatic Conference on the Convention on Nuclear Safety, over which Argentina had presided, had agreed on certain principles that should guide implementation

of the Convention by each of the States parties. The Declaration also called for the strengthening of the review system under the Convention, to reflect all improvements in technological safety necessary to provide key assurances on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

52. The periodic meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management would be held in 2015. Another important event was the entry into force in April 2015 of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, a convention that Argentina had been one of the first to sign and ratify. Those were all positive developments, particularly in the context of the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference. Responsible policies for the export of nuclear materials were central for Argentina, which was why it had once again assumed the chairmanship of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, for a term beginning in June 2015.

53. **Mr. Burkart** (United States) said that the United States was fully committed to promoting access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. It would be making an additional commitment to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative of \$50 million over the next five years, as part of its long-standing and continued support for the Agency.

54. No non-proliferation approach could succeed if it was based on denying rights to nations that played by the rules. New frameworks for civil nuclear cooperation were needed, so that countries could gain access to peaceful power without increasing the risk of proliferation. His Government sought to secure and minimize the civilian use of highly enriched uranium, while cooperating to develop and deploy technologies that could achieve the same benefits without using the substance. Partners should rely on the global market and fuel assurance mechanisms, to which the United States had provided tangible support, as an alternative to pursuing indigenous enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. States that were new to nuclear power should draw on efforts under way in the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation to explore alternative, multilateral approaches to the back end of the fuel cycle.

55. The United States took pride in its record of peaceful nuclear cooperation. It was a major promoter

of global nuclear commerce, with 22 bilateral agreements in place providing the basis for cooperation with 49 partners. Those agreements bound the United States and its partners to non-proliferation conditions that were in accordance with Treaty obligations and commitments under the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines. Most of the cooperation was focused on nuclear power, demand for which was expected to grow. Use or pursuit of nuclear power required national infrastructure that met the highest standards for safety, security and non-proliferation. Nuclear power remained of critical importance to the future of peaceful uses, and was another area where IAEA played an essential role.

56. The impacts of the Fukushima Daiichi accident were still being felt. Recent efforts to review the foundations of nuclear safety, including the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, were welcome. The United States also strongly supported implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and welcomed the entry into force of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.

57. Improving nuclear safety required addressing past issues, in particular the accident at Chernobyl. As the largest bilateral donor to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund, the United States worked closely with the Group of Seven (G7) and the European Commission to support Ukraine in returning the Chernobyl site to an environmentally safe and stable condition. The successful pledging conference held in April 2015, at which 165 million euros had been raised towards completing that work, was encouraging. The contributions of peaceful nuclear energy went far beyond power production. Every day, the peaceful atom was being used to promote development, including the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and would likely play an important role in the post-2015 development agenda.

58. The United States was the single-largest contributor to IAEA technical assistance programmes, to which it had provided close to \$200 million since 2010. It would be providing an additional \$2 million to help upgrade the IAEA laboratories at Seibersdorf, Austria for the benefit of IAEA member States. It would be contributing another \$50 million to the Peaceful Uses Initiative, bringing its total pledge to \$100 million since 2010, benefiting more than 150 member States.

59. His delegation hoped that the Review Conference would reflect the advances in peaceful nuclear technology-sharing and identify steps to further strengthen the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He drew attention to the working paper submitted by his delegation (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.46), which identified a number of actions that the Review Conference could take regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and another working paper submitted by a number of delegations, including his own (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.47), which focused on ways in which States might misuse the provision for withdrawal from the Treaty and identified steps that could be taken to discourage such misuse. Despite a divergence of views on the matter, a consensus should be possible on the issue of withdrawal if all delegations worked together in a spirit of cooperation.

60. **Mr. Seokolo** (South Africa) said that the demand for nuclear power and nuclear technology continued to increase. The inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology was important in attaining sustainable economic growth, especially in developing countries. Any decision that would amount to a reinterpretation of or restriction on that right should be resisted. The Conference should reaffirm the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference, including the stipulation that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses should be respected.

61. Through the work of IAEA, all States parties, especially developing countries, had benefited from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Agency's nuclear applications laboratories were unique to the United Nations system and enabled it to transfer much-needed and often life-saving technologies and skills to States parties to combat and eradicate animal diseases and contribute to cancer management and water resources management. South Africa thus attached great value to the laboratories at Seibersdorf, Austria and welcomed the decision to renovate them. However, if the necessary financial contributions were not forthcoming by June 2015, the Agency would not be able to begin work as planned. The announcement by Japan of its contribution to the renovation of the laboratories was therefore encouraging. He appealed to other States parties to follow suit.

62. The IAEA technical assistance programmes were more than mere political commitments; they were important building blocks to assist developing countries alleviate poverty and achieve international

development goals. South Africa remained concerned about the lack of sufficient, assured and predictable funding for the Agency to meet the increasing number of requests for technical cooperation projects.

63. Greater efforts were needed to balance the allocation of resources among major IAEA programmes to enable full implementation of article IV of the Treaty. His delegation looked forward to an agreement on the programming budget for the IAEA technical cooperation targets for the biennium 2016-2017 that would reflect the commitment of States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Extrabudgetary support to the Technical Cooperation Programme had proved an important source of funding over the last five years. South Africa had made extrabudgetary contributions through its Africa Renaissance and Cooperation Fund to improve veterinary laboratory capacities in sub-Saharan Africa for the control of various transboundary animal diseases. That project had also benefited from the Peaceful Uses Initiative and would contribute significantly to food security and poverty reduction in Africa.

64. Lastly, the Treaty must be implemented in all its aspects, without favour or prejudice, with no aspect more strictly enforced or requiring stricter implementation than any other.

65. **Mr. Mathews** (Australia) said that the Treaty had contributed to global economic development by enabling the use and transfer of nuclear science and technology. The Review Conference should assess the implementation of the 18 action items on peaceful uses of nuclear energy set forth in the 2010 action plan, in order to determine which of them should be reaffirmed and strengthened and whether specific areas not covered in 2010 should receive attention in the coming years.

66. There had been solid progress on nuclear safety following the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, and an increased high-level focus on nuclear security, as well as growing recognition of the essential role of nuclear applications in the areas of human health, water management, agriculture and environmental protection. IAEA had assisted 140 of its member States in those areas.

67. His Government acknowledged the right of all States parties to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. States could choose not to exercise all their rights, or

to exercise those rights collectively. It supported international cooperation to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment and information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, recognized the particular importance of peaceful nuclear energy to developing countries, and encouraged relevant IAEA programmes to focus on those needs.

68. Australia remained a staunch supporter of IAEA and its Technical Cooperation Programme, and would continue to contribute to that Programme by paying its target share in full and on time, and urged others to do likewise. Australia had, in that regard, announced that it would contribute an additional 350,000 euros to the Peaceful Uses Initiative, of which 250,000 euros would be for the revitalization of the Research Centre in Seibersdorf, Austria and the remaining 100,000 euros would be for Peaceful Uses Initiative projects in the Asia-Pacific region.

69. With regard to nuclear safety and security, Australia urged all States to avail themselves of the IAEA guidance offered through the Agency's Safety Standards and Nuclear Security Series documents and many peer review services, and underscored the importance of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Australia was a leader in the use of low-enriched uranium fuel and targets for medical isotope production. By 2016, its molybdenum-99 production should enable it to meet over 20 per cent of world demand. Low-enriched uranium technology was a viable pathway for molybdenum-99 production that reduced the proliferation risk. States using highly enriched uranium should move to low-enriched uranium.

70. Australia urged agreement on a set of principles governing the exercise of the right to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, since the withdrawal of any State from the Treaty would have serious implications for international security. Withdrawal had an impact on the work of all three Main Committees, but it fell to Main Committee III to consider it. He called on the Committee to carefully consider the working papers submitted by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.16](#) and [NPT/CONF.2015/WP.17](#)) and the Vienna Group of Ten ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.1](#)), which contained useful recommendations on items considered by the Committee.

71. **Mr. Benítez Verson** (Cuba) said that in Cuba, the use of nuclear technology in vital sectors of the

economy was valued highly, and the rate of technical cooperation with IAEA, ongoing since 1977, was the highest in the Caribbean region. It was vitally important for developing countries and small island developing States that technical cooperation with IAEA should be free of political conditions. Plans to set conditions for the full exercise of the legitimate right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology under article IV of the Treaty were disturbing and unacceptable.

72. Nuclear fuel supply could not become the monopoly of a small number of countries, and under no circumstances should it become a mechanism to exert additional political pressure on certain States. It was a violation of the spirit and letter of the Treaty and of the mandate of IAEA to prevent the development of programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Cuba rejected attempts to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool to achieve political ends, in violation of the IAEA statute.

73. Agreements on transfer oversight must be transparent, non-discriminatory and open to participation by all States, to guarantee that no restrictions would be placed on access to nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, which developing countries needed. The Review Conference should establish a concrete mechanism to consider concerns of States parties with regard to specific cases in which transfers of materials and equipment for the peaceful use of nuclear energy had been denied.

74. Cuba rejected any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, whether in use or under construction. Such an attack would represent a grave danger to human life and the environment and a serious violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the IAEA statute. Cuba hoped that the Conference would adopt a broad, multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear installations.

75. **Ms. Kanasewich** (Canada) said that States in full compliance with their peaceful use obligations arising from articles I, II and III of the Treaty could have access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy to support their sustainable socioeconomic development. Canada contributed to the full spectrum of those activities, including in the areas of human health,

agriculture, food security, water, the environment, energy, radiation technology and security and safety.

76. The Fukushima Daiichi accident had served as a reminder of the need to adhere to the highest standards of safety. After the disaster, some countries had begun phasing out use of nuclear power, while others had postponed plans to build new facilities. The accident had led to new IAEA guidance on nuclear safety, to be followed by all nations, whether experienced in the use of nuclear power or not. In that context, countries were once again including nuclear energy in their power supply strategies, which was particularly important in the light of growing energy demand and increasing production and urbanization.

77. With over 65 years of experience in the nuclear field, Canada had a strong nuclear industry that engaged with other countries through IAEA, as well as on a bilateral basis, to share its knowledge on the full range of power and non-power applications. Canada shared its nuclear fuel cycle expertise with its closest partners in the context of responsible and mutually beneficial nuclear cooperation. It currently had 30 nuclear cooperation agreements covering 48 countries and was ready to engage in new nuclear cooperation with various partners that fulfilled their non-proliferation requirements. The agreements not only protected the high non-proliferation standards that Canada itself embraced, but also established requirements for its partners.

78. Canada supported the call of the Vienna Group of Ten to make the IAEA additional protocol a condition for the supply of nuclear energy, and encouraged all States that had not already done so to conclude an additional protocol and bring it into force. The additional protocol, along with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, represented the nuclear verification standard. Under that framework, countries could be confident that the continued growth and expansion of nuclear energy could take place in a manner that was safe, secure and did not contribute to proliferation.

79. Lastly, only the full implementation of IAEA safeguards could give States confidence that cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would not contribute to nuclear proliferation. The Committee should recommend that the Review Conference should stress that State party compliance with the non-proliferation and verification requirements

of the Treaty was a necessary precondition for access to peaceful nuclear cooperation.

80. **Mr. Smirnov** (Russian Federation) said that the Russian Federation had consistently advocated broad access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy for States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the promotion of relevant international cooperation under article IV of the Treaty, based on the premise that there was no alternative to nuclear energy. The technology could address many contemporary challenges, even though States could choose individually not to exercise all their rights with regard to nuclear energy. Given the particular importance of peaceful nuclear energy to developing countries, the relevant IAEA programmes should focus on those countries' needs.

81. The international community was slowly recovering from the shock of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, which had had a negative impact on attitudes towards nuclear energy. However, the most recent IAEA data indicated an ongoing increase in the demand for nuclear energy. As of the end of 2014, there had been 438 nuclear power-generating units in operation worldwide, with a total net installed capacity of 375.9 gigawatt hours and another 70 units were under construction. Nuclear power thus remained appealing for many countries and continued to play an important role in achieving international energy security and sustainable development.

82. The development of nuclear energy was a priority for the Russian Federation. Since the launch of the world's first nuclear power plant in Obninsk in 1954, his country had gained tremendous experience in that area. The Russian nuclear sector now included 350 concerns and organizations employing over 255,000 people and ensuring the full nuclear energy production cycle, as well as a broad range of scientific, research, experimental and design applications. Operating plants in the Russian Federation provided nuclear fuel not only for domestic power plants, but also for many nuclear power plants located abroad. His Government aimed to increase the share of nuclear power in its energy mix from 16 to 25 per cent by 2030, which would require opening 28 new nuclear power plants.

83. The Russian Federation was the only country in the world where a 600 megawatt fast-neutron reactor had been operating successfully for many years. The construction of an 800 megawatt reactor had also been

completed. An experimental fast-neutron reactor based on Russian technology was operating in China. A research institute in Dimitrovgrad was carrying out a project involving the construction of a new multipurpose research fast reactor to replace its only functional research fast reactor using sodium coolant BOR-60. The reactor would also serve as the centrepiece of an international research centre.

84. The Russian Federation had for many years been providing assistance to States parties to the Treaty in developing nuclear technology and constructing and operating nuclear power plants. There were joint projects under way or under discussion with Belarus, China, Finland, Turkey, Hungary and Jordan. In cooperation with Kazakhstan, it had established the International Uranium Enrichment Center as part of an initiative to develop global nuclear energy infrastructure and create international centres to provide nuclear-fuel-cycle services for controlling the spread of sensitive nuclear-fuel-cycle technologies without hindering world nuclear energy development. In doing so, the Russian Federation was helping to ensure reliable access to the benefits of nuclear energy for all interested countries, in compliance with the non-proliferation regime.

85. Under an IAEA agreement, a reserve of 120 tons of low-enriched uranium with enrichment of no more than 5 per cent had been established. All the necessary nuclear material for the reserve had been deposited at a storage facility in Angarsk in late 2010 and placed under IAEA safeguards. The Russian Federation was bearing all costs associated with storage, maintenance, safety and security of the reserve and the application of the relevant safeguards at the facility. The Russian Federation reaffirmed its unwavering support for the IAEA project to establish its own low enriched uranium bank and welcomed the offer from Kazakhstan to provide a site for the bank.

86. IAEA experts and others had for many years stated that bilateral, regional and global cooperation at the final stage of the nuclear fuel cycle would provide a solution to issues of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. A country that supplied nuclear power plants could also provide a comprehensive service package that included not only nuclear fuel supply but also removal of spent fuel.

87. The Russian Federation used such an approach with some countries. It ensured the return of highly

enriched uranium fuel for research reactors from third countries in cooperation with the United States and IAEA. It also supported the IAEA programme aimed at reducing enrichment of nuclear fuel for research reactors to below 20 per cent. Implementation would reduce significantly the risk associated with the proliferation of highly enriched uranium.

88. The Russian Federation participated in the main international legal nuclear safety mechanisms and its specialists participated actively in the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. It was also implementing a series of additional projects with IAEA to support the Plan, as well as a number of other voluntary international initiatives to verify and confirm the safety of Russian nuclear technologies.

89. His Government was an initiator and major sponsor of the IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, designed to create economically competitive, environmentally safe nuclear power systems that would reduce the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensure sustainable development. The Project provided States with an understanding of technological innovations and institutional characteristics that contributed to a transition to sustainable nuclear power systems. The Russian Federation welcomed the decision of the Director General of IAEA to turn the Project into a fully operating section within the Department of Nuclear Energy starting in early 2014.

90. The Russian Federation had always met its obligations under unilateral and bilateral agreements and projects concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy and would continue to do so, regardless of political developments. The intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and a number of agreements on specific areas of cooperation established the necessary legal framework.

91. Lastly, the Russian Federation was determined to work closely with States parties to the Treaty to establish a truly up-to-date system of cooperation that should ensure the safe development of global nuclear energy without risk of nuclear proliferation and would be based on IAEA safeguards and multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.